The Safe Operation of Oil Tankers in the Maritime Industry: A Risk-Based Operational Analysis
1. Module Context and Assessment Overview
Oil tankers remain among the highest-risk vessel categories in global commercial shipping. The combination of flammable and toxic cargo, complex cargo-handling systems, and demanding operational environments means that safety cannot be managed through procedure alone. Effective tanker safety requires a structured, evidence-based approach rooted in formal risk assessment methodologies, international regulatory compliance, and robust Safety Management Systems (SMS).
This assessment asks you to apply risk-based thinking to real operational conditions on oil tankers. You are not simply describing what the rules say; you are evaluating how well risk management works in practice, where systemic gaps exist, and what a sound operational framework looks like. The task directly supports the module’s core learning outcomes and prepares you to operate confidently within regulated maritime environments, whether as a deck officer, marine engineer, marine superintendent, or maritime safety professional.
This brief has been developed in alignment with the International Safety Management (ISM) Code, the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), the SOLAS Convention, and the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, all of which form the regulatory backbone of this topic.
2. Learning Outcomes Assessed
On successful completion of this assessment, you will have demonstrated the ability to:
- Critically evaluate the principal operational hazards associated with oil tanker operations using recognised risk assessment tools and frameworks.
- Analyse the effectiveness of the ISM Code and related international conventions in managing safety risks specific to tanker operations.
- Apply risk-based operational thinking to cargo handling, inert gas systems, tank cleaning, bunkering, and emergency scenarios.
- Assess the role of human factors, crew competency, and safety culture in tanker accident causation and prevention.
- Produce a structured, well-evidenced technical report that meets professional maritime industry standards.
3. Assessment Task
Write a 2,500–3,000-word individual technical report addressing the following scenario and analytical task:
Your technical report must address all four of the following analytical components:
Component A – Hazard Identification and Risk Classification
Identify and classify the five most significant operational hazards on crude oil tankers (e.g., cargo vapour ignition, tank entry asphyxiation, mooring failures, structural fatigue, cargo overflow). For each hazard, apply a standard risk matrix or bow-tie analysis to assess likelihood and consequence severity. Justify your classification using data from casualty investigation reports or industry statistics.
Component B – ISM Code Compliance and Safety Management System Evaluation
Evaluate how effectively the ISM Code addresses the identified hazards within a working SMS. Critically assess whether procedural compliance alone is sufficient, or whether a deeper safety culture change is required. Reference at least one real tanker casualty investigation (e.g., MAIB, NTSB, or IMO reports) to support your argument.
Component C – Operational Risk Controls and Permit-to-Work Systems
Analyse the role of operational risk controls including inert gas systems, enclosed space entry procedures, hot work permits, and cargo watch protocols. Evaluate the strengths and limitations of permit-to-work (PTW) systems as a risk control tool on tankers, drawing on industry evidence and, where applicable, human factors research.
Component D – Emergency Preparedness and Continuous Improvement
Assess the adequacy of emergency preparedness measures, including muster drills, oil spill contingency planning, and firefighting readiness. Propose two evidence-based recommendations for improving your company’s risk management framework, explaining how each recommendation would reduce residual risk and align with IMO guidelines or flag state requirements.
4. Format and Structural Requirements
Your technical report must follow a professional maritime industry reporting structure. It is not an essay. Use the following sections as your report framework:
- Title Page – Report title, your student ID (not name), module code, submission date, word count.
- Executive Summary (150–200 words, not counted in word count) – A brief overview of the report’s scope, key findings, and recommendations.
- Table of Contents
- Introduction (200–300 words) – Contextualise the report within the current tanker industry safety landscape. State your analytical approach clearly.
- Hazard Identification and Risk Classification (Component A)
- ISM Code Compliance and SMS Evaluation (Component B)
- Operational Risk Controls and PTW Systems (Component C)
- Emergency Preparedness and Recommendations (Component D)
- Conclusion (200–250 words) – Synthesise your findings; do not introduce new material.
- Reference List – Harvard format; minimum 8 academic and professional sources, published 2015–2026.
- Appendices (if applicable) – Risk matrices, bow-tie diagrams, or annotated casualty summaries.
Formatting Standards
- Font: Arial or Times New Roman, 12pt, double-spaced.
- Margins: 2.54 cm (1 inch) all sides.
- Page numbers in the footer, right-aligned.
- All figures and tables must be numbered, titled, and cited.
- Submit as a single PDF or Word document via the LMS portal by the stated deadline.
5. Source and Evidence Requirements
A minimum of eight sources is required. At least five must be peer-reviewed academic journal articles or edited book chapters. The remaining sources may include IMO circulars, MAIB accident investigation reports, OCIMF guidance documents (e.g., ISGOTT, TMSA), or flag state maritime administration publications. Industry casualty reports are encouraged and should be cited as primary evidence where they directly support an analytical point.
Acceptable source categories include:
- Peer-reviewed journals: Ocean Engineering, Safety Science, Maritime Policy and Management, Journal of Navigation, Marine Technology and SNAME News.
- IMO publications: ISM Code (resolution A.741(18) as amended), MSC circulars, MARPOL Annex I.
- Casualty investigation reports: MAIB (UK), ATSB (Australia), NTSB (USA), EMSA (EU).
- Industry guidance: OCIMF ISGOTT (7th edition), TMSA3, ICS Tanker Safety Guide.
- Academic texts: Stopford (2022), Baird (2020), IMO Model Courses.
6. Marking Rubric and Assessment Criteria
This assessment is marked out of 100 points, weighted at 40% of the module grade. The four components are weighted as follows:
| Assessment Criterion | Weight | Distinction (80–100%) | Merit (65–79%) | Pass (50–64%) | Fail (0–49%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A. Hazard Identification and Risk Classification | 25% | Hazards are precisely identified using recognised frameworks (bow-tie, FMEA, risk matrix). Likelihood/consequence ratings are fully justified with casualty data and industry statistics. Analysis goes beyond surface description to reveal systemic risk patterns. | Four or five hazards correctly identified and risk-rated with good use of methodology. Minor gaps in justification or source support. | Basic hazards listed with some attempt at risk classification. Limited use of formal methodology; evidence is descriptive rather than analytical. | Hazards listed without classification. No risk methodology applied. Largely descriptive with no analytical depth or evidence base. |
| B. ISM Code Compliance and SMS Evaluation | 25% | Critical evaluation of ISM Code adequacy is sustained, balanced, and evidence-driven. Safety culture is discussed with reference to human factors theory. Casualty case study is closely integrated into the argument, not appended as an aside. | ISM Code strengths and limitations are identified. At least one casualty case is referenced. Safety culture is mentioned but analysis could be deeper. | ISM Code is described adequately. Casualty reference is present but superficially used. Compliance treated as sufficient without critical evaluation. | ISM Code is summarised but not evaluated. No casualty reference or human factors consideration. No critical analysis evident. |
| C. Operational Risk Controls and PTW Systems | 25% | Operational controls are critically analysed, not merely described. PTW strengths and documented failure modes are both addressed with industry or academic evidence. Inert gas system, enclosed space, and hot work contexts are all integrated coherently. | PTW analysis is clear and uses evidence. Most key controls are addressed. Some limitations identified but not fully explored. | Controls listed with partial analysis. PTW discussion is largely procedural rather than critical. Limited use of evidence or examples. | Controls and PTW mentioned superficially. No critical analysis. Descriptive only, with no engagement with limitations or failure cases. |
| D. Emergency Preparedness and Recommendations | 15% | Emergency measures critically evaluated against current IMO and OCIMF standards. Two recommendations are specific, evidence-based, and operationally feasible with clear links to residual risk reduction and regulatory alignment. | Emergency preparedness assessed with some critical commentary. Recommendations present and plausible but could be more specific or better evidenced. | Emergency procedures described. Recommendations offered but generic or unsupported. Limited regulatory alignment. | Emergency response mentioned briefly. No meaningful recommendations, or recommendations are unrelated to the analysis. |
| E. Report Structure, Academic Writing, and Referencing | 10% | Report follows professional technical structure precisely. Writing is clear, precise, and appropriately formal. Harvard referencing is error-free; minimum eight sources, correctly formatted. | Structure is sound with minor deviations. Writing is mostly clear. Referencing is mostly correct with minor errors. | Basic structure present. Writing is adequate but inconsistent in tone or clarity. Referencing has recurring errors or fewer than eight sources. | Poor structure; sections missing or out of order. Writing is unclear or informal throughout. Referencing is absent, incomplete, or substantially incorrect. |
Grade Boundaries (UK/Australia/US Equivalencies)
| Mark Range | UK Grade | Australian Grade | US GPA Equivalent |
|---|---|---|---|
| 80–100% | First Class (Distinction) | High Distinction | A (4.0) |
| 65–79% | Upper Second / Merit | Distinction / Credit | B+ – A- (3.3–3.7) |
| 50–64% | Lower Second / Pass | Credit / Pass | C – B (2.0–3.0) |
| 40–49% | Third / Compensatable Fail | Pass (some institutions) | D (1.0) |
| 0–39% | Fail | Fail | F (0.0) |
7. Guidance for Students
Common Weaknesses to Avoid
- Describing regulations without evaluating their effectiveness. Every regulatory reference should be accompanied by an assessment of how well it works, with evidence.
- Listing hazards without applying a formal risk methodology. A risk matrix or bow-tie diagram in an appendix, with written interpretation in the body, is expected at distinction level.
- Using casualty investigations as decoration rather than argument. If you cite a tanker incident, explain precisely what it reveals about the systemic weakness you are analysing.
- Writing conclusions that simply restate the introduction. The conclusion must synthesise the findings from all four components and point toward a coherent risk management position.
- Over-relying on websites or maritime news articles as sources. Trade press can contextualise; peer-reviewed journals and official investigation reports must carry the analytical load.
Recommended Analytical Approach
Start with Component A before drafting any other section. The hazard classification you establish there should anchor every argument that follows. Each hazard you identify in Component A should trace directly into the regulatory gaps you discuss in Component B, the control failures in Component C, and the preparedness gaps in Component D. A tightly connected report reads like a single argument, not four separate short essays.
Use of Industry Sources
ISGOTT (International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals), the OCIMF Tanker Management Self-Assessment (TMSA3), and MAIB investigation reports carry significant credibility in maritime technical reports. Treat them as primary professional evidence. Pair them with academic sources for the theoretical underpinning of human factors and safety management arguments.
Sample (for Guidance Only)
Oil tankers operate at the intersection of highly flammable cargo, complex mechanical systems, and dynamic marine environments, making them one of the most hazard-dense vessel categories in the global fleet. Despite decades of regulatory development under the IMO, tank vessel casualties continue to occur at a rate that demands both procedural rigour and genuine organisational commitment to safety culture. A purely compliance-driven approach to tanker operations has repeatedly proved insufficient; the Prestige disaster in 2002 and the MT Hebei Spirit incident in 2007 both demonstrated that rule-following without embedded risk awareness creates residual vulnerabilities that formal audits fail to catch.
Risk-based operational analysis moves beyond checklist compliance by requiring operators to quantify the probability and consequences of specific failure scenarios before they occur. Formal risk assessment tools, including the bow-tie model and the International Maritime Organization’s Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) framework, provide systematic structures for mapping hazards, identifying barriers, and evaluating barrier adequacy across the full range of cargo operations. Applied rigorously within a functioning Safety Management System, these tools shift safety management from reactive incident response to proactive risk elimination.
Cargo vapour control remains one of the most persistent sources of tanker casualties, with inert gas system failures documented in a significant proportion of explosion events on crude oil carriers. Bhattacharya (2012) demonstrated that even when inert gas systems are technically compliant, operator decision-making under time pressure frequently leads to oxygen level exceedances that formal procedure alone does not prevent, highlighting the critical intersection between technical systems and human factors in tanker safety management (Bhattacharya, 2012, doi:10.1016/j.ssci.2012.05.007).
Enclosed space entry fatalities on tankers account for a disproportionate share of the maritime industry’s occupational fatality statistics. Permit-to-work systems were designed as administrative barriers to unsafe entry, yet investigations by the Marine Accident Investigation Branch consistently reveal that PTW documents were signed and present at the time of fatal incidents, indicating that procedural compliance and genuine risk control are not equivalent outcomes in practice.
Emergency preparedness on oil tankers extends well beyond muster station familiarity. Effective emergency response requires trained, cross-functional teams capable of managing concurrent crises, whether a cargo fire, a structural breach, or a man-overboard scenario during cargo operations. The gap between drill performance and genuine emergency readiness is itself a safety risk that competent DPAs must account for in their annual SMS reviews.
Port State Control inspections conducted under the Paris and Tokyo MOU regimes provide the most publicly accessible dataset on recurring tanker safety deficiencies. Analysis of PSC detention records between 2019 and 2024 reveals that ISM Code-related deficiencies, fire safety non-compliance, and pollution prevention system failures consistently dominate the top ten deficiency categories on tanker vessels, suggesting that the regulatory framework is not translating into uniform operational safety improvements across the global fleet.
References (Harvard Format)
Bhattacharya, S. (2012) ‘The effectiveness of the ISM Code: A qualitative enquiry’, Safety Science, 50(7), pp. 1751–1759. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2012.05.007 [Accessed 10 January 2026].
Heij, C. and Knapp, S. (2018) ‘Crew, ship, and company factors of influence on accident risk for oil tankers’, Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment, 65, pp. 620–628. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trd.2018.10.005 [Accessed 10 January 2026].
Porathe, T., Hoem, Å. and Rødseth, Ø.J. (2021) ‘Human and organisational factors in maritime accidents: A framework for improving investigation and analysis’, Safety Science, 140, 105273. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2021.105273 [Accessed 12 January 2026].
Lim, G.J., Cho, J. and Biobaku, T. (2018) ‘Safety and risk analysis of liquefied natural gas and oil tanker operations’, Journal of Offshore Mechanics and Arctic Engineering, 140(5), pp. 051304. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1115/1.4039648 [Accessed 14 January 2026].
Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) (2023) Annual Report 2022. Southampton: MAIB, UK Department for Transport. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/marine-accident-investigation-branch [Accessed 20 January 2026].
OCIMF (2023) International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals (ISGOTT). 6th edn. London: Witherby Publishing Group.
International Maritime Organization (IMO) (2018) ISM Code and Guidelines on Implementation of the ISM Code. London: IMO Publishing. Available at: https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/HumanElement/Pages/ISMCode.aspx [Accessed 15 January 2026].
Yang, Z.L., Bonsall, S. and Wang, J. (2022) ‘Formal safety assessment of risk from oil tanker collisions using CREAM’, Ocean Engineering, 250, 110990. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.oceaneng.2022.110990 [Accessed 17 January 2026]
